CRITICAL FACILITY/COMPONENT HAZARD ASSESSMENT

EM Associates has completed training on both the C.A.R.V.E.R. and the Texas A&M Advanced Threat Analysis processes. This coupled with the experience derived from conducting the Department of Homeland Security Assessment of 9 Alabama Counties and subsequent hazard assessments provides EM Associates clients with comprehensive Terror and other Hazard assessments of their critical facilities.

Below is a description of both processes. EM Associates will use both the C.A.R.V.E.R. and TEEX Advanced Threat Analysis processes to develop an extensive and detailed assessment of critical facilities and provide a comprehensive report those clients can use to harden and protect their critical facilities. EM Associates can use these processes to evaluate only the terrorism hazard or use an EM Associates enhanced process to assess other manmade and natural hazards.

C.A.R.V.E.R. TARGET ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION
The following is an explanation of the C.A.R.V.E.R. targeting process. This process is used in targeting adversary's critical facilities and components and to evaluate them from an adversarial point of view. C.A.R.V.E.R. is used by Army Special Operations (ARSOF) personnel, Security Information Officers, and operational personnel throughout the targeting and mission planning process to assess mission, validity, requirements, technical appreciation and target analysis.

CRITICALITY, ACCESSIBILITY, RECUPERABILITY, VULNERABILITY, EFFECT, AND RECOGNIZABILITY FACTORS
The C.A.R.V.E.R. selection factors assist in selecting the most critical facilities or components to attack or assess. As the factors are considered, they are given a numerical value. This value represents the desirability of attacking the target. The values are placed in a decision matrix. The sum of the values indicates the highest value target or component to be attacked within the limits of the statement of requirements and commander’s intent. 

CRITICALITY
Criticality is an assessment of target value and is the primary consideration. A target is critical when its destruction of damage has a significant impact on military, political, or economic operations of an entity.

Targets associated with an entity must be considered in relation to other elements of the entity. The value of a target will change as the situation develops, requiring the use of time-sensitive methods respond to changing situations. For example, when one has few locomotives, railroad bridging may be less critical as targets; however, safeguarding bridges may be the more critical component. Criticality depends on several factors:

·    Time: How rapidly will the impact of the target attack affect operations?
·    Quality: What percentage of output, production, or service will be curtailed by target damage?
·    Surrogates: What will be the effect on the output, production, and service?
·    Relativity: How many targets are there? What are their positions? How is their relative value determined? What will be affected in the system or complex “stream”?

A target is accessible when an operational element can reach the target with sufficient personnel and equipment to accomplish its mission. A target can be accessible even if it requires the assistance of knowledgeable insiders. This assessment entails identifying and studying critical paths that the operational element must take to achieve its objectives, and measuring those things that aid or impede access. The adversary must not only be able to reach the target but must also remain there for an extended period. The four basic steps identifying accessibility are: 

·       Infiltration from the staging base to the target area.
·       Movement from the point of entry to the target or objective.
·       Movement to the target’s critical element.
·       Exfiltration.

Factors considered when evaluating accessibility include, but are not limited to:
·    Active and passive early warning systems.
·    Swimmer detection devices.
·    Air defense capabilities within the target area.
·    Road and rail transportation systems.
·    Type of terrain and its use.
·    Concealment and cover.
·    Population density.
·    Other natural or synthetic obstacles and barriers.
·    Current and climatic weather conditions.

The analysis along each critical path to the target should measure the time it would take for the action element to bypass, neutralize, or penetrate barriers and obstacles along the way. Accessibility is measured in terms of relative ease or difficulty of movement for the operational element and the likelihood of detection. The use of standoff weapons must always be considered.

RECUPERABILITY
A target’s recuperability is measured in time; that is, how long will it take to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction of or damage to the target? Recuperability varies with the sources and type of targeted components and the availability of spare parts availability. Factors, which should be considered when assessing recuperability, include, but are not limited to, the availability of: 

·       On-hand equipment such as railroad cranes, dry docks, and cannibalization.
·       Restoration and substitution through redundancies.
·       On hand spares.
·       Equivalent OB equipment sets that backup critical equipment or components, and the effects of economic embargoes and labor unrest.

VULNERABILITY
A target is vulnerable if the adversary has the means and expertise to successfully attack the target. When determining the vulnerability of a target, the scale of the critical component needs to be compared with the capability of the attacking element to destroy or damage it. In general, the attacking element may tend to:

·       Choose special components.
·       Do permanent damage.
·       Prevent or inhibit cannibalization.
·       Maximize effects through the use of onsite materials.
·       Cause the target to self-destruct.

Specifically, vulnerability depends on:
·       The nature and construction of the target.
·       The amount of damage required.
·       Available assets; i.e. personnel, expertise, motivation, weapons, explosives, and equipment.

EFFECT
The effect of a target attack is a measure of possible military, political, economic, psychological, and sociological impacts at the target and beyond. This is closely related to the measure of target criticality. The type and magnitude of given effects desired will help the select targets and target components for assessment and attack. Effect in this context addresses all significant effects, whether desired or not, that may result when target facility or component is attacked. Traditionally, this element has addressed the effect on the local population, but now there are broader considerations. Effect is frequently neutral at the tactical adversarial level. Effects can also include:
·       The triggering of countermeasures.
·       Support or negation of PSYOP themes.
·       Unemployment.
·       Reprisals against the civilian populace.
·       Collateral damage to other targets.

Possible effects can be speculative and should be labeled as such. Effects of the same attack may be quite different at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. For example, the destruction of a power substation may not affect local power supply but cuts off all power to an adjacent region.

RECOGNIZABILITY
A target’s recognizability is the degree to which it can be recognized by the adversary and his intelligence collection and reconnaissance assets, under varying conditions. Weather has an obvious and significant impact on visibility. Rain, snow, and ground fog may obscure observation. Road segments with sparse vegetation and adjacent high ground provide excellent conditions for good observation. Distance, light, and season must also be considered. Other factors that influence recognizability include the size and complexity of the target, the existence of distinctive target signatures, the presence of masking or camouflage, and the technical sophistication and training of the adversary.

C.A.R.V.E.R. MATRIX
These C.A.R.V.E.R. factors and their assigned values are used to construct a C.A.R.V.E.R. matrix. For the adversary this is a tool for rating the desirability of potential targets and wisely allocating attack resources. For the installation commander, it is a tool to counter the adversary.

To construct the matrix, list the adversary's potential targets in the left column. For strategic level analysis, list the installation's systems or subsystems (electric power supply, rail system). For tactical level analysis, list the complexes or components of the subsystems or complexes selected by your MEVA analysis. As each potential target is evaluated for each C.A.R.V.E.R. factor, enter the appropriate targets have been evaluated, add the values for each potential target. The sums represent the relative desirability of each potential target; this constitutes a prioritized list of targets. Attack those targets with the highest totals first.

If additional men and/or munitions are available, allocate these resources to the remaining potential targets in descending numerical order. This allocation scheme will maximize the use of limited resources. Planners can use the C.A.R.V.E.R. matrix to present the installation's staff with a variety of adversary defeat options. With the matrix they can discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each COA against the installation's targeted facility.
 

TEEX THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

The Texas A&M Threat and Risk Assessment Process addresses the prevention, mitigation, management, and/or respond to all hazards and/or mass casualty events, with special attention to terrorist’s incidents.

The process involves conducting a capabilities-based comprehensive CBRNE/terrorism risk (threat and vulnerability), capabilities, and needs (planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises) assessments and addresses jurisdictional assessments (i.e., risk, capabilities, and needs) including: 

• Threat assessment
• Vulnerability assessments
• Capability assessments
• Needs assessments
• National preparedness goal
• Target capabilities list
• Universal task list
• HSPD 5 and 8

This process augment the process taught in the current Department of Homeland Security/Office of Grants and Training (DHS/OG&T) Threat and Risk Assessment course (T&RA). And involves conducting a comprehensive assessment of the critical vulnerabilities in the jurisdiction and develop an action plan to prevent, reduce and/or mitigate the potential damage from a Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE)/terrorism incident.

The systematic process assesses selected infrastructure, facilities, systems, and special events for methods and measures to prevent, reduce and/or mitigate vulnerabilities.